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The Future of International Adjudication
Fred L. Morrison*
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of
wisdom, it was the age offoolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was
the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Ligh4 it was the season
of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair
Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities**
For those who survey the state of international law, these
are "the best of times" and "the worst of times." As we enter
into the United Nations' Decade of International Law, we rec-
ognize the value of the rule of law in the protection of interna-
tional peace as a "spring of hope." As we simultane6usly enter
into a "winter of despair" arising from military conflict in the
Persian Gulf area, we recognize the fragility of that law. In the
political arena, the end of the Cold War and the easing of bipo-
larism have meant liberation from tyranny for many and the
reduction of the risks of nuclear war for all. The absence of
that same bipolarism, however, has fragmented the established
order and led to other clashes that the major powers formerly
might have controlled.
For students of the International Court of Justice and of
international dispute resolution by third-party adjudication,
these are also the "best of times" and the "worst of times." For
those who view it as an "age of reason," the Court's caseload
has skyrocketed. It currently has eight cases pending on its
docket,1 a substantial increase from the empty docket the Court
* Oppenheimer Wolff & Donnelly Professor of Law, University of Min-
nesota. This Essay was originally delivered on November 13, 1990, as the inau-
gural lecture for this professorship.
** C. DICKENS, A TALE OF TWO CIIES 15 (C. Woodcock ed. 1970) (1859).
1. The present cases are Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) (form and amount of reparation); Border
and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.); Land, Island, and Maritime
Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.); Maritime Delimitation in the Area between
Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.); Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Iran
v. U.S.); Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.); Arbitral Award
of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal); and Territorial Dispute
(Libya/Chad). Letter from Bernard Noble, Deputy-Registrar, International
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faced two decades ago.2 Even Libya has seen fit to bring sev-
eral of its most troublesome controversies to the Court.3 For
those who see it as the "age of darkness," however, the Court's
role in the international legal community has substantially
diminished. Major nations have refused to accept or have
renounced their acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdic-
tion, and the Court's work has largely been confined to a single
subject matter, the delimitation of disputed boundaries. 4
I. THE STATE OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
The idea of the adjudication of disputes between nations
largely developed during the past century. In the nineteenth
century and before, war was considered an ordinary, necessary,
and proper way in which to resolve international disputes. It
was simply "a continuation of political intercourse, carried on
with other means."5 Two Hague Peace Conferences, in 1898
and 1907, led to the establishment of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration, a framework institution for a series of part-time
arbitral tribunals.6 The Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice (Permanent Court), established in 1921, complemented the
Permanent Court of Arbitration by providing a full-time tribu-
nal to deal with international disputes. 7
The statute that created the Permanent Court provided for
two basic kinds of jurisdiction.8 One kind was based on treaties
that referred specific cases or classes of cases between the
treaty partners to the Court.9 The other was based on unilat-
Court of Justice, to Prof. Fred Morrison, University of Minnesota (Nov. 20,
1990) [hereinafter Letter].
2. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 25.
4. See infra note 24.
5. C. VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 75-89 (M. Howard & P. Paret trans. ed.
1984) (1832).
6. See Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,
July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779, T.S. No. 392; Convention for the Pacific Settlement
of International Disputes, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2199, T.S. No. 536.
7. The Permanent Court of Arbitration is composed of ad hoc panels of
arbitrators convened under the standing organization to resolve individual dis-
putes. The Permanent Court of International Justice, in contrast, consisted of
a standing body of jurists who would hear all cases. This structure was in-
tended to provide uniformity of decision making.
8. For further discussion of the Permanent Court, see M. HUDSON, THE
PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, 1920-1942 (1943).
9. Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Dec. 16, 1920,
art. 36, 6 L.N.T.S. 390, 403; cf. STAT. I.C.J. art. 36(1). For a discussion of juris-
diction under the modern form of this clause, see Morrison, Treaties as a
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eral declarations, under which individual states could declare
their readiness to accept adjudication of cases submitted by
other states.' 0 It was hoped that most nations would eventually
submit these declarations, so that courts, rather than war,
would eventually resolve international disputes.
Despite political reservations that prevented the United
States from entering the League of Nations, the United States
government seriously considered joining in the work of the
Permanent Court, but the Senate's objections to international
involvement kept the country out of this international institu-
tion, as well.'" Nevertheless, several distinguished Americans
served among the Court's judges, including Frank Kellogg of
St. Paul, the former Senator and Secretary of State who had
been instrumental in formulating the Kellogg-Briand Pact.'2
Thomas Franck and Jerome Lehrman have aptly summarized
American attitudes toward the Court as following one of two
themes: a "messianistic" belief in the ability of judicial institu-
tions to solve all international problems or a "chauvinistic" be-
lief in the superiority of political resolution of disputes.' 3
These two competing themes have plagued discussion of inter-
national adjudication throughout its history.
When the League of Nations passed into history at the end
of World War II, the Permanent Court went with it.' 4 The Per-
manent Court was immediately replaced with a "new" Interna-
tional Court of Justice (International Court) under the auspices
Source of Jurisdiction, Especially in U.S. Practice, in THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 58 (L. Damrosch ed. 1987).
10. This acceptance was subject to a condition of reciprocity. Statute of
the Permanent Court of International Justice, supra note 9, art. 36, 6 L.N.T.S.
at 403; cf. STAT. I.C.J. art. 36(2). For a discussion of jurisdiction under the
modern form of this clause, see Morrison, Potential Revisions to the Accept-
ance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice by
the United States of America, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMPUisORY
JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 29 (A. Arend ed.
1986).
11. For a general history of the period, see M. DUNNE, THE UNITED
STATES AND THE WORLD COURT, 1920-1935 (1988).
12. Other American judges included John Bassett Moore and Manley 0.
Hudson. S. ROSENNE, DOcuMENTs OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
431 (1979).
13. Franck & Lehrman, Messianism and Chauvinism in America's Com-
mitment to Peace Through Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT
A CROSSROADS, supra note 9, at 3, 6-7.
14. For all practical purposes, the Permanent Court ceased regular func-
tioning in 1939. S. ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURn WHAT IT Is AND How IT
WORKS 15 (4th ed. 1989). It was formally dissolved in April of 1946, when the
new International Court of Justice began to operate. Id. at 27.
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of the new United Nations.15 The new International Court pos-
sessed an organic statute that was almost a carbon copy of its
predecessor's statute; it occupied the same courtrooms in the
Hague, and it performed most of the same functions in the in-
ternational order. Change was to be found, however, in the at-
titude of the United States.16 In the heady days of the 1940s, a
majority of the world's nations accepted compulsory jurisdic-
tion of the Court, including, grudgingly, the United States.17
Indeed, for nearly forty years, the United States continued to
accept that compulsory jurisdiction - with a limitation, known
as the Connally Reservation, which provided an exception for
cases that were "within the domestic jurisdiction of the United
States of America as determined by the United States."' 8 Dur-
ing that period, the United States became the one of the Inter-
national Court's most frequent litigants.19
During that same period, the number of nations in the
world more than tripled, and consequently the number of
United Nations members rose from 51 to 159. The Interna-
tional Court, however, experienced a crisis of confidence, as
many of the newly independent nations initially shied from ac-
cepting its jurisdiction, primarily because of fears that the
Court was too oriented in favor of the established order.2 0 Ma-
jor powers also retreated from its use. In the late 1940s, a ma-
jority of the world's nations, including all of the major powers
except the Soviet Union,2 ' accepted the International Court's
compulsory jurisdiction. Today the proportion of states ac-
cepting the compulsory jurisdiction is much lower, less than
one-third, and the only permanent member of the Security
Council accepting compulsory jurisdiction is Great Britain.22
Indeed, at one time in the early 1970s - an era not noted for
the absence of international disputes - the Court had abso-
15. Id- at 27.
16. 1948-49 U.N.Y.B. 151, 1120-21, U.N. Sales No. 1950.1.11.
17. See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
18. 61 Stat. 1218, 1218, T.I.A.S. No. 1598, at 1. The full text of the declara-
tion is conveniently reproduced in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT
A CROSSROADS, supra note 9, annex C at 489.
19. The United States appeared as a formal party in seven cases. In addi-
tion, it filed seven additional applications against Soviet block states that were
dismissed for want of jurisdiction. It also participated extensively in the advi-
sory opinion work of the Court.
20. R. FALK, REVIVING THE WORLD COURT 62 (1988).
21. S. ROSENNE, supra note 14, at 91, 307-11.
22. Id. at 91.
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lutely nothing on its docket.23
In the past two decades, the International Court has be-
come, in fact, a specialized tribunal. Half of its work deals with
only one subject-matter, the delimitation of disputed bounda-
ries, primarily maritime boundaries.24 Its most frequent liti-
gants, in addition to the United States, are now an unlikely pair
of states, Libya and Nicaragua.25
The United States has participated in four cases before the
Court during the same two decades, including one border dis-
pute, which settled the maritime boundary with Canada in the
Atlantic.26 Two others, the Iranian hostages case27 and the Nic-
23. From the delivery in 1975 of the advisory opinion in the case of the
Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, until the filing in 1976 of the case concerning
the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. 3, there was a
period of 10 months when there were no cases pending before the Court.
There were also no cases on the docket for nearly six months in 1970, from the
decision of Barcelona Traction Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970
I.C.J. 3, until the initiation of the advisory opinion request on Legal Conse-
quences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
1971 I.C.J. 3.
24. Half of the eight cases presently pending are boundary disputes. They
involve the boundaries between El Salvador and Honduras, between Green-
land and Jan Mayen Island (represented by Denmark and Norway respec-
tively), between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, and between Libya and Chad. See
Letter, supra note 1. Other cases during the past decade decided maritime
boundaries between Libya and Tunisia, Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya),
1982 I.C.J. 18, between Libya and Malta, Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta), 1985
I.C.J. 13, and between the United States and Canada, Delimitation of the Mari-
time Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246. Ear-
lier boundary disputes included the North Sea continental shelf cases, North
Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger./Den.; W. Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3.
25. Both Libya and Nicaragua have border problems with their neighbors.
For example, since 1975, Libya has been involved in litigation with Tunisia,
Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, and with Malta, Continental
Shelf (Libya/Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13. Recently, Libya has agreed to adjudication
of its border dispute with Chad. Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad) (case pend-
ing). Nicaragua has been involved in four suits. In addition to the well-known
suit against the United States, Military and Paramilitary Activites in and
against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 169 (provisional measures), 1984
I.C.J. 392 (jurisdiction and admissibility), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (merits), it has initiated
suits against Costa Rica, Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v.
Costa Rica), 1987 I.C.J. 182, and Honduras, Border and Transborder Armed
Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.) (case pending), and has recently intervened in a bor-
der dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, Land, Island and Maritime
Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.) (case pending).
26. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area
(Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246.




aragua litigation,2s were instances of high political visibility.
The fourth, less visible, case involved the resolution of an in-
vestment dispute with Italy.2 9 Actions of the United States
were also the subject of one advisory opinion, relating to the
status of the Palestine Liberation Organization's delegation to
the United Nations in New York.30
The Nicaragua litigation led the United States government
first to oppose the International Court's exercise of jurisdiction
on technical grounds and eventually to terminate totally its ac-
ceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction.31 After forty
years of accepting compulsory jurisdiction by declaration, the
United States abandoned that approach. Although one can ad-
duce certain technical reasons for that decision - scholars of
all persuasions had long recognized the United States declara-
tion accepting compulsory jurisdiction to be technically defi-
cient3 2 - the real controversy was over whether political or
judicial means should be used to resolve the most serious inter-
national disputes. The termination simply renewed the debate
between the polar extremes of "messianism" and "chauvinism"
that has colored American attitudes toward the Court since the
1920s. It reopened the question of whether a judicial system
can resolve international disputes, or whether the international
political process is a superior means for their solution. The
United States wanted to exclude the "hottest" controversies
from the Court in order to reserve them for the political and
diplomatic processes. The specific rationales supporting this ac-
28. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 169 (provisional measures); 1984 I.C.J. 392 (jurisdiction and
admissibility); 1986 I.C.J. 14 (merits). The United States did not participate in
the merits phase of the case. See id. at 17.
29. Electronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15.
30. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the
United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, 1988 I.C.J. 12 (Advi-
sory Opinion).
31. The United States terminated the 1946 declaration accepting compul-
sory jurisdiction by a notice on October 7, 1985, which took effect six months
later. U.S. Terminates Acceptance of .CJ. Compulsory Jurisdiction, DEP'T ST.
BuLL., Jan. 1986, at 67.
32. Because the Connally Reservation, see supra note 18 and accompany-
ing text, could be reciprocally enforced against the United States, it permitted
any other state to avoid a United States suit. See Aerial Incident of 27 July
1955 (U.S. v. Bulgaria), 1960 I.C.J. 146. Another reservation to the 1946 decla-
ration, the so-called Vandenberg Reservation, relating to multilateral treaties,
also had a technical flaw. As a result, the United States was unable to rely




tion will be discussed later.3
II. OTHER TRIBUNALS
The International Court is not the only tribunal adjudicat-
ing controversies between nations. In the modern world, it
faces increasing competition from other international bodies,
with an alphabet soup of names, like ICSID34 and GATT.1
Particularly within Europe, there are also effective regional
tribunals that, through resolution of private disputes, have re-
duced the potential business that might come to the Interna-
tional Court.36 A thorough examination of the state of
international adjudication must include these institutions.
Their work has expanded, just as the workload of the Interna-
tional Court itself has remained fairly constant.
A leading example of an alternative system for the resolu-
tion of disputes between nations is the successful resolution of
many international trade disputes under the auspices of the dis-
pute-resolution panels of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT).3 7 Authors of the Statutes of the Interna-
33. The rationale of the United States government can be found in two
statements of the Department of State relating to the Nicaragua case. See
supra note 28. The first sets forth the government's rationale for its refusal to
participate further in the case, including a lengthy statement on the proper
role of the Court, as seen by the United States. U.S. Withdrawal from the
Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in the ICJ, 1985 DEP'T ST. BULL., Mar.
1985, at 64. The second articulates the formal termination of compulsory juris-
diction. U.S. Terminates Acceptance of ICJ Compulsory Jurisdiction, 1986
DEP'T ST. BULL., Jan. 1986, at 67. Both are reprinted in THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS, supra note 9, at 472-78.
34. The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes.
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Na-
tionals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270,
T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. This agency was created by the World
Bank and operates under its auspices. A network of treaties governs its
functions.
35. Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade, open for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A2051, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1948). This agreement estab-
lishes the framework for international trade relations.
36. The European Court of Justice in Luxembourg decides cases arising
under the treaties establishing the European Communities. The European
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg decides cases arising under the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights. International resolution of claims by
these tribunals prevents the underlying disputes from escalating to a dispute
between nations.
37. The formal provisions of the GATT relating to disputes are contained
in Article XXIII, which does not refer to the panels at all, but rather to ac-
tions by the Contracting Parties to the Agreement. General Agreement on
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tional Court (and of its predecessor, the Permanent Court) ap-
parently assumed that the Court (or possibly a specialized
chamber of it) would resolve legal questions in trade disputes.-S
That has never been the case; such disputes normally have
been resolved in special mechanisms within GATT. GATT's
work in this regard has been steadily increasing.
What are the characteristics of GATT adjudicative deci-
sion-making?3 9 First, the cases are all based upon a fixed body
of written law, the General Agreement and its subordinate
agreements. In each case the parties to the dispute have agreed
to the basic text in question; the issues for the panel are the
elaboration of that text and the appreciation of the facts of the
case, and not of finding law from some general principles.40
Second, the process is technically not adjudication in the strict
sense of the word. The governing body of GATT appoints each
panel and the panel technically only makes a report or recom-
mendation to the governing body. In the governing body, each
state, including the defendant state, could theoretically impose
a negative vote to prevent adoption of the panel report.41 This
means that states recognize that they have an opportunity, both
before and after the panel decision, to preclude an unacceptably
negative result, although such a veto itself could carry a very
heavy political price. Third, the process itself is relatively
rapid, inexpensive, and private, when contrasted to Interna-
tional Court procedures.
A second example of effective international dispute resolu-
tion is in the International Centre for the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes (ICSID), which operates under the auspices of
the World Bank.4 An intricate network of treaties supports
this system and allows foreign investors and states to adjudicate
Tariffs and Trade, supra note 35, art. XXIII, 61 Stat. at A64-65, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, at 60-61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 266-69. The Contracting Parties refer the disputes
to panels.
38. See STAT. I.C.J. art. 26(1). Article 26(1) of the Statute of the Court
provides for specialized, subject-matter chambers. One of the subject matters
specifically mentioned is "transit and communication," an element of interna-
tional trade. Id
39. For a general discussion of this process, see R. HUDEC, ADJUDICATION
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES (1978) [hereinafter R. HUDEC, INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE DISPUTES]; R. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:
GATT DIsPUTE SETrLEmENT IN THE 1980s (1990).
40. See R. HUDEC, INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES, supra note 39, at 5-
11.
41. Id at 11-13.
42. See supra note 34.
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disputes involving compensation for direct or indirect nationali-
zation of investment properties.
What are the characteristics of the ICSID system?43 As
with GATT, the parties specifically agree to the applicable stan-
dards in advance.4 The process is also relatively quick, inex-
pensive, and private, when contrasted to International Court
proceedings. In addition, this system admits a new kind of
party to the international process. In the ICSID, the foreign in-
vestor can make its claim directly.45 In contrast, in the Interna-
tional Court, the claim could be put forward only after the
investor's government has "espoused" it, making it a matter of
diplomatic controversy between the two states.46 In a very im-
portant way, this serves to depoliticize the claims, potentially to
the advantage of all concerned.
The work of the two European courts, in Luxembourg47
and in Strasbourg,"s has likewise increased phenomenally dur-
ing the same period. Although formally concentrating on
claims brought by individuals against states (or sometimes
those of pan-European institutions against states), these courts
have managed to transform what would otherwise be the grist
for disputes between nations into the mode of judicial resolu-
tion. The European courts find their authority and the applica-
43. For a general description, see Shihata, The Settlement of Disputes Re-
garding Foreign Investment: The Role of the World Bank, with Particular
Reference to ICSID and MIGA, 1 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 97 (1986).
44. See id. at 103-04.
45. Id-
46. In traditional approaches to international law, only a state could be
the bearer of "rights." An individual or company that was harmed by a for-
eign government had no direct international claim; only that individual's or
company's government could have such a claim. The process of making that
claim was called "espousal." Once the claim was espoused, it became part of
the diplomatic agenda between the disputing states.
47. The European Court of Justice in Luxembourg decides cases under
the treaties that establish the Common Market. See C. GRAY, JUDIcIAL REmE.
DIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 120 (1987). Indeed, those treaties provide that it
will have exclusive jurisdiction, thus cutting off resort to the International
Court. Most of the cases before the European Court involve disputes between
private parties and governments or between the European Community's insti-
tutions and national governments, rather than government-to-government
conflicts. The institutionalization of these conflicts, however, helps reduce the
potential for conflicts between states.
48. The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbeurg decides cases
under the European Convention on Human Rights. See C. GRAY, supra note
47, at 149. Again, the conflicts presented to it involve individual claims, but
the resolution of those claims through this process may reduce the occasion for
disputes between governments about these same issues.
1991]
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ble law in the European Community treaties49 and the
European Convention on Human Rights,5° respectively.
Other international adjudication mechanisms have also
flourished. There is a new final dispute resolution mechanism
for trade disputes between the United States and Canada.51 An
international tribunal is arbitrating the thousands of claims fol-
lowing from the Iranian Revolution.52 Even Egypt and Israel
were able to resolve a territorial.dispute through an authorita-
tive international arbitration.53
All of this activity demonstrates that nations are increas-
ingly turning to forms of third-party dispute resolution. Why
are nations, including the United States, eschewing the Interna-
tional Court? What are the prospects for third-party dispute
resolution?
III. CHALLENGES TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
Some of the challenges to the use of the International
Court as a dispute resolving body can be illustrated from the
experience of the United States, especially from its decision to
terminate its declaration accepting jurisdiction under the "op-
tional clause." The purpose of this presentation is not to re-
hearse the wisdom or folly of particular decisions of the Court
or of the United States government, but simply to illustrate the
issues involved. Some of the challenges, however, come from
outside of that particular controversy, but nevertheless require
attention.
A. CHALLENGE 1: THE COURT EXCEEDS ITS PROPER ROLE
In 1984, faced with an impending suit from Nicaragua, the
United States tried to limit its acceptance of the jurisdiction of
the Court.55 After failing in that attempt, the United States
withdrew its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction in 1985.
Some of the rationale offered for that action focused on the
49. See C. GRAY, supra note 47, at 120.
50. Id at 149.
51. See Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 1, 1988, United States-
Canada, 27 I.L.M 293 (1988).
52. See C. GRAY, supra note 47, at 181-85.
53. See Dispute Concerning Certain Boundary Pillars (Egypt v. Isr.)
(Egypt-Israel Arb. Trib. 1988), 27 I.L.M 1427 (1988).
54. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
55. See S. ROSENNE, supra note 14, at 217-23. The United States was not
the only state to act in this manner. For example, the United Kingdom once
altered its declaration to avoid impending litigation.
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then stinging defeat in the jurisdictional proceedings before the
Court; others were more technical in nature.-6 These rationales
for excluding jurisdiction, which I call "challenges" to the
Court, deserve reexamination at this time.
The first challenge is based on the fundamental position
the United States government took in the Nicaragua litiga-
tion:5 7 diplomatic, rather than judicial, means should be em-
ployed to resolve the most serious political-military disputes.
The unsuccessful United States position had several formula-
tions. The United States claimed that the United Nations Char-
ter granted the Security Council exclusive jurisdiction over
such controversies.ss In the alternative, it argued that the par-
ticular kind of dispute was inherently incapable of adjudication
because of the impossibility of presentation of evidence, the
lack of timeliness in adjudication, the risk of revealing military
secrets and the like.59
When originally articulated, these issues were expressed in
a Cold War context, in which many decisionmakers and com-
mentators saw a need to confront Soviet supported measures
that might upset an otherwise precarious balance of power.
With the end of the Cold War and with that set of conceptions
now behind us, is there still need or support for such a set of
limitations on the authority of the Court?
Useful insights can be drawn from the development of dis-
pute resolution in other areas, particularly in GATT. In the
GATT context, dispute resolution mechanisms gradually have
evolved; they were not created with simple intellectual rigor in
a single statute. GATT dispute resolutions deal with a wide va-
riety of issues, from the mundane to the essential. At least be-
tween the major industrialized countries, the conflicts of the
56. The United States has not been alone in this attitude. France with-
drew its declaration in the 1970s. The Soviet Union, despite protestations in
recent years about the desirability of adjudication of disputes, has never con-
sented to the general jurisdiction of the Court and has never appeared as a
party there. Indeed, among the 'Big 5" Security Council members, only the
United Kingdom continues to admit compulsory jurisdiction under the op-
tional clause, and it does so in a form that permits it to revoke jurisdiction on
a moment's notice, as it has done when confronting potential suits against it.
57. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (jurisdiction and admissibility).
58. Id- at 432-36.
59. Id. at 429-31, 436-38. The United States also argued other grounds for
refusing jurisdiction, such as the alleged failure of Nicaragua itself to file a
proper declaration accepting jurisdiction, were also argued. They are not per-
tinent to this point.
1991]
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future are likely to be economic and trade conflicts, not mili-
tary ones. How has GATT dealt with the resolution of
disputes?
In some respects, GATT's dispute resolution system is simi-
lar to that of the International Court. Each of the disputing
parties presents its claims to a neutral panel, which renders a
report based on "GATT law."0 There, however, the similari-
ties end.
In legal terms, GATT's dispute resolution mechanism has
been formally based in the assembly of members. In that body,
each nation, including the "defendant state," has a vote and ac-
tions can be taken only with unanimous consent.6' Thus, each
nation has the potential to block the creation of a panel, to in-
sist upon a specific formulation of the "terms of reference," or
to block the acceptance of the panel report. Given this exten-
sive authority to block adjudication, it may seem surprising that
the vast majority of legal controversies have successfully been
resolved in accordance with legal norms.
I submit that the relative success of the GATT mechanism
has been because of, not in spite of, its recognition of a political
role in the process. When nations feel their vital national inter-
ests are at stake, they will seek ways to protect those interests,
even if those ends are in technical violation of international
norms. But when nations perceive that their longer-term goals
can be accomplished only through acceptance of some adverse
decisions, they will acquiesce in those decisions to achieve the
greater goal.
What kinds of factors lead to that acceptance? First, under
the GATT system nations have the power to avoid adjudication
because a member country may refuse to agree to the constitu-
tion of a panel, to its membership, or to its terms of reference.
This veto power is equivalent to the United States' much-
maligned Connally reservation to the jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Court.62 Far from being a cause for concern, this pro-
vision may have aided in the resolution of disputes under this
procedure.
Recent efforts to reduce the ability of GATT members to
veto dispute resolution processes indicate the importance of
60. See R. HUDEC, INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES, supra note 39, at 7.
61. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 35, art.
XXV, 61 Stat. at A65-66, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 64, 55 U.N.T.S. at 272-73; see also
R. HUDEC, INTERNAL TRADE DISPUTES, supra note 39, at 5-11.
62. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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that veto in the evolution of the GATT system. During the re-
cent Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, there
were efforts to make the panel dispute resolution process more
"automatic" and "judicial."63 These efforts were based in part
on confidence built in the dispute resolution mechanisms
through the GATT's active resolution of a large number of
cases." Even if that confidence is not yet sufficient to support
such full judicialization of the process, the mere fact of the pro-
posals demonstrates how confidence can be built. In GATT,
that confidence was built upon a series of actual cases, not upon
the theorectical soundness of an artificial framework.
Some analogies can be drawn to the "political question"
doctrine in domestic constitutional law. In the earliest days of
the Republic, a relatively broad political question doctrine may
have been essential to the functioning of the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court accepted the proposition that certain gov-
ernmental actions, although guided by law, were unsupervised
by courts.65 The Supreme Court could not have enjoined effec-
tively the Southern States from conducting the Civil War; in-
deed, no one thought to ask it to do so. Yet, after the nation as
a whole had come to accept the Court as an authoritative deci-
sionmaker, the political question doctrine was narrowed until it
is now virtually meaningless as a limitation on the Court's au-
thority.6 It was the broad-scale acceptance of the Supreme
Court as a legitimate decisionmaker by all parts of society that
made this transformation possible. I submit that the interna-
tional community has not yet reached this level of acceptance
of the International Court as such an ultimate decisionmaker.
The fiat of a statute will not achieve that transformation by it-
self. Rather, as was true in the case of the domestic political
question doctrine, acceptance of the International Court as the
63. See generally 1 LAw AND PRACTICE UNDER GATT § III (K. Simmonds
& B. Hill eds. 1989) (documents and commentaries related to the Uruguay
Round of negotiations).
64. GATT panels had heard 111 cases by the end of 1989. More than half
of these, 59 to be exact, were referred to panels in the 1980s alone. R. Hudec,
The Judicialization of GATT Dispute Settlement (May 3, 1990) (paper deliv-
ered at conference entitled "Due Process and Transparency in Trade: Interna-
tional Rules and Domestic Procedures" and to be published in a conference
volume by the Centre for Trade Policy and Law and the Faculty of Law of the
University of Ottawa, Canada).
65. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849) (guarantee of "re-
publican form of government" not justiciable).




ultimate decisionmaker must gradually be reached by the pro-
cess of building confidence.
B. CHALLENGE 2: THE INTERNATIONAL COURT IS LEGISLATING
A second challenge to the International Court is that it is
"legislating" by creating new norms of international law, rather
than interpreting and applying existing law. Perhaps some-
what reminiscent of charges that the United States Supreme
Court often "legislates," this challenge presents special
problems in the field of international law.
International law is a peculiar system. There is no single,
simple, authoritative legislature. New rules of law emerge
either from customary law, reflecting the nearly universal prac-
tice of sovereign states, or from treaties or other specific agree-
ments that states have signed and ratified. The Court, of
course, interprets and applies both kinds of law in its decisions.
It decides cases by a simple majority vote.67 When it decides
(even if by a bare majority) that some rule has been accepted as
a universal customary practice, that decision binds the parties.68
International law today is in a state of rapid change. A
host of new issues exist: control of the environment, of outer
space, of the exploitation of the seabed, and so on. Half a cen-
tury ago, these subjects were simply incomprehensible. In addi-
tion, the legal implications of other existing issues have clearly
changed. For example, human rights receive vastly greater
protection than was the case a half century ago. Insofar as
these changes have been based on treaties or other explicit
agreements, they reflect explicit state consent. Insofar as these
changes are predicated upon other forms of legal development,
such as newly emerging customary law or rules evolved from
non-binding General Assembly declarations, there is no equi-
valent clear state consent and, thus, there is far less willingness
to accept adverse judicial determinations because they smack of
legislation by an extraordinarily small body.
Again, one can return to the specificity of the norms in-
volved and the clarity of national consent. When those two fac-
tors are present, adjudication has been relatively successful as a
dispute resolution mechanism. These may be factors that con-
tribute to the success both of the ICSID and GATT systems. In
both cases the law is fairly clear at the outset. In the ICSID ar-
67. STAT. I.C.J. art. 55.
68. Id art. 59.
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bitrations, for example, one need not resolve the controversies
surrounding the appropriate standards of compensation for na-
tionalization of property. The arbitrators merely have to apply
the standard that was explicitly accepted in the agreement.69
ICSID decisionmakers have the more limited task of applying
settled law to the facts. Because the range of that discretion is
more constrained, risks of unanticipated adverse consequences
are thus more limited. Likewise in GATT, the basic rules have
been accepted in the General Agreement itself or in the
subordinate Codes that are formally accepted as international
agreements. The panel members are applying the terms of ac-
cepted law.
The European Court of Human Rights's decisions provide
another example. There again, the tribunal is administering an
agreed text, rather than creating law from general principles.70
C. CHALLENGE 3: THE INTERNATIONAL CouRT IS BIASED
Perhaps most fundamental of the challenges to the Inter-
national Court is the charge that it is biased. The challenge ex-
ists at two levels: One is specific, the other systemic.
The specific charges of bias are based upon specific inci-
dents that need not be examined here. Less-than-desired con-
duct occurs in all judicial systems. Indeed, one reason for
having a bench of fifteen judges, rather than a smaller tribunal,
is to minimize the effects of such conduct if it occurs.
The more troubling aspect of this challenge is systemic. It
is based upon the selection process for judges. Although the
governing Statute provides a complex process by which the Se-
curity Council and the General Assembly vote upon proposed
candidates, who are supposed to be "elected regardless of their
nationality from among persons of high moral character,"71 the
real selection process is somewhat more complex. In fact, the
judges of the Court are selected, in effect, on the same system
of geographic representation that prevails throughout the
United Nations system.72 One judge normally comes from each
of the five permanent members of the Security Council.73 Two
69. Shihata, supra note 43, at 100.
70. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 45, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 246.
71. STAT. I.C.J. art. 2.
72. The Statute does provide that in the Court as a whole "the representa-
tion of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the
world should be assured." Id art. 9.
73. For many years after its recognition by the United Nations as the gov-
1991]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
of the others come from Western Europe, one from Eastern Eu-
rope, one from the Arabic states, two from sub-Saharan Africa,
two from Asia, and two from Latin America. In practice,
caucuses of the General Assembly representatives from each of
these areas determine which of the candidates will be chosen.
Once these selections have been made, other nations, both in-
side and outside of the region, usually vote for the "group"
nominee. The formal election process has been little more than
a ratification of those regional choices, unless the relevant
group of nations is unable to agree on a single candidate.
One can analyze probable voting patterns (or, at the very
least, predispositions) of the judges. If one applies to the Inter-
national Court an analysis similar to that which would be ap-
plied in looking at the United States Supreme Court, there are
interesting results. Five or six judges (those from the United
States, Britain, France, the Western European countries, and
Japan) can be expected to support the traditional Western
views of international law. Three judges (from the Soviet
Union, China, and Eastern Europe) have normally supported
more Socialist views of law. The balance of six or seven judges,
largely from "Third World" countries, hold the "swing votes."
Many of these judges, at least of the older generation, have
strong connections to the traditional approaches to interna-
tional law.
Further, most of these judges also had diplomatic experi-
ence in the legal missions of their countries to the United Na-
tions. Indeed, service in United Nations bodies has become a
virtual prerequisite to selection to the Court, especially because
the effective selection process of judges from Third World
countries takes place within the "groupings" of the General As-
sembly.74 With the "swing votes" increasingly likely to come
from former diplomatic representatives of these countries to
the General Assembly, one should at least question their prob-
able orientation toward legal questions and the proper role of
the General Assembly in the creation and formulation of inter-
ernment of China, the People's Republic of China did not nominate a judge for
the Court. During the absence of China from the Court, that seat appears to
have been occupied by an additional judge from the Arabic countries. China
was again represented beginning in 1985. Rosenne, The Changing Role of the
International Court, 20 ISRAEL L. REV. 182, 191-92 (1985).
74. Seven of the ten judges from non-permanent members currently serv-
ing on the Court had significant experience in United Nations organizations.




Perhaps more troubling than the election process is the
need of the judges to seek periodic reelection. The term of of-'
fice is nine years.7 6 Most judges seek to serve two (or some-
times more) terms. Reelection requires a repetition of the
same General Assembly and Security Council selection process.
For those originally so selected, renewal of the relevant re-
gional group's endorsement will be a prerequisite to this selec-
tion. A judge may be tempted to follow the political line of the
relevant electoral groups, rather than a more strict legal analy-
sis, especially as the time for reelection occurs. Subtle pres-
sures in this regard may be as invidious as overt ones.
The arguments for a protected tenure for judges is as com-
pelling in the international scene as it is in the domestic one.
The perils of an electoral system in which there are only 163
voters,77 who comprise the entire body of potential litigants, is
even more disturbing. The fact that the General Assembly is
the primary electoral body in point of fact may lead to greater
deference to its decisions than international law warrants. A
protected tenure could take the form of a limitation of service
to a single term, perhaps a term somewhat longer than the cur-
rent nine year period.
'D. MISCELLANEOUS CHALLENGES
There have been other more specific challenges to the ju-
risdiction of the Court. Most of them have been fairly technical
in nature. They have included concerns about the Court's ap-
parent opposition to a third state's intervention in litigation (an
opposition that appears to have mellowed in the past year78)
and the minimalist jurisdictional threshold it applies in impos-
ing preliminary measures, the international equivalent of a
temporary restraining order. These challenges can only be
briefly mentioned in this Essay. Some are within the control of
the Court itself; others would require an amendment of the
Court's Statute to remedy.
75. See Morrison, Legal Issues in the Nicaragua Opinion, 81 AM. J. INT'L
L. 160, 160-61 (1987).
76. STAT. I.C.J. art. 13, para. 1.
77. In addition to the members of the General Assembly, four other small
states have ratified the Statute of the Court, but not the United Nations Char-
ter. They are entitled to vote in judicial elections. They are Liechtenstein,
Nauru, San Marino, and Switzerland. 1987-88 I.C.J.Y.B. 49 (1988).
78. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salv. v. Hond.) (Inter-
vention of Nicar.), 1990 I.C.J. 4 (Order of Feb. 28).
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One of these is the provision of the Court's Statute that
provides that "Only states may be parties to cases before the
Court. '79 This provision excludes claims brought by (or
against) both international organizations and individuals (or
companies) that have international claims. The exclusion of in-
ternational organizations represents an outdated jurispruden-
tial approach of the 1920s. Despite Charles DeGaulle and
Margaret Thatcher, the European Community has a presence
(if not a personality) in international affairs that must be recog-
nized, not ignored. General international organizations, like
the United Nations itself, must also be taken into consideration.
The international community has developed a series of legal
fictions that alleviate, but do not cure this problem. 0 An
amendment to the Statute clearly is warranted.
The exclusion of individuals and corporations from the
Court's jurisdiction is more problematic. Certainly one would
not wish to have the Court become a tribunal of first instance
with general jurisdiction for resolution of all of the world's ills.
But equally, an insistence that a nation espouse a claim before
it can be presented to this international tribunal has the effect
of transforming a relatively private dispute into a potentially
political one. Some alternative, perhaps modeled after one of
the other international tribunals, should be sought. For exam-
ple, the ability of ICSID arbitration panels and of the European
Court on Human Rights to dispose of claims brought by individ-
uals or groups without transforming them into state-to-state
controversies is one of the keys to their success.8 '
Finally, there is the question of cost. Obtaining a decision
from the International Court is not only time-consuming but,
due to its nature, expensive.8 2 Much of the procedure of the
Court remains from a time of far greater formality and cere-
79. STAT. I.C.J. art. 34.
80. Various legal fictions have been used to deal with this problem. The
most common is for the international organization to seek an advisory opinion,
which the organization and the state concerned agree to treat as binding. See,
e.g., Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and
Egypt, 1980 I.C.J. 73 (Advisory Opinion). Another approach is for two states to
"appeal" a decision of the international organization by ordinary litigation be-
tween themselves. See, e.g., Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO
Council (India v. Pak.), 1972 I.C.J. 46.
81. Shihata, supra note 43, at 102-06.
82. Although parties save the cost of paying judges and the expense of the
registry and court facilities by using the Court, other direct and indirect costs
can outstrip the savings. Compliance with Court formalities, including the fil-
ing of hundreds of copies of printed memorials (instead of typed briefs), at-
tendance of agents at pre-hearing proceedings, etc., escalate costs. The fact
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mony. Ways of simplifying procedure and reducing cost might
be explored.
IV. THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
ADJUDICATION
Where do the current problems with the International
Court lead in terms of the future of the international dispute
resolution and the role of the Court in it. The relative success
of the "other" dispute resolution systems presents optimistic
possibilities. Most nations are willing to resolve many of their
disputes in peaceful ways, frequently including reference to
binding third-party dispute settlement. Given the proper con-
text, this approach can be quite successful. This adjudicating
mechanism usually involves the application of relatively spe-
cific rules and the delimitation of the issues to avoid the ques-
tions of the greatest national sensitivity.
We can expect to see the growth of the alternative dispute
resolution tribunals over time. The disputes of the future will
increasingly be economic in nature. Such disputes will proba-
bly fit more readily into a GATT or GATT-type mold than into
the International Court's system, especially if the GATT model
offers advantages of time, cost, and privacy. In the alternative,
we can expect to see international disputes diverted to regional
organizations, such as the European Court or the Canada-
United States Arbitration Panels. And, if we believe the advo-
cates of alternative dispute resolution, a strict adherence to for-
mal mechanisms of adjudication is already obsolete.
What about the International Court itself? Are there ways
to enhance its jurisdiction and authority? Whenever this ques-
tion is posed, an inconclusive debate between Franck and Lehr-
man's "messianists" and their "chauvinists" normally ensues.
This debate pits those who would accept the Court's jurisdic-
tion as an act of faith against those who would reject it as an
act of faith. That dispute has remained unresolved for at least
seventy years; it is likely to remain unresolved for seventy
years more. It is the argument (to hearken back to the quota-
tion from Dickens at the opening of this Essay) between those
who see an "epoch of belief" and those who see an "epoch of
incredulity."
I submit that this argument is irrelevant in the modern
that hearings are always conducted at the Hague may also add to costs, espe-
cially if the disputing parties are not European.
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world. Adhering to the pragmatic school of jurisprudence,s s I
suggest that we have been asking the wrong questions for sev-
enty years. Asking whether we should (or should not) have ab-
solute confidence in a World Court as an abstract proposition is
.a vain and futile question. Rather, we should ask how we can
build confidence in an International Court, and test that confi-
dence with reasonable degrees of risk. If the confidence is then
well-founded, the acceptance of jurisdiction and of the Court's
work can grow. If not, the risk will be limited by the manner
of submission of the dispute to the Court.
The notion of "confidence-building measures" is not new.
It was one of the cornerstones of the Helsinki Agreement that
was a precursor to the thawing of the Cold War.84 It involved,
not global leaps of faith, but very limited, tentative steps to test
the reactions of others. A similar approach might be taken on
the question of international jurisdiction.
Confidence is built, not on grand theories, but on actual
practice. For that reason, it is necessary to identify some spe-
cific instances in which the Court can be given jurisdiction and
can effectively respond to the challenges provided.
One suggestion is that a series of subject-matters be identi-
fied in which there would be agreement to take international
disputes to the International Court. The idea is not new. It
was once proposed in the course of negotiations for the original
Permanent Court.8 5 It was rejected in favor of a broader "leap
of faith" approach under the "optional clause." That idea has
not gained the support necessary to make it universally effec-
tive. It is time to try a different approach.
The idea proposed above is similar to the one that Abra-
ham Sofaer, the former Legal Adviser to the Department of
State, proposed.8 6 His considerably more elaborate version
would also call for the use of chambers, rather than providing
access to the full Court, and would initially be available only to
the five permanent members of the Security Council.8 7 Such
83. Cf Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV.
1331, 1341-43 (1988).
84. Part 2 of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (commonly known as the Helsinki Accords) is entitled "Document
on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarma-
ment." Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act, Au-
gust 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292, 1297 (1975).
85. M. HUDSON, supra note 8, at 192-93 & n.40.
86. Sofaer, Adjudication in the International Court of Justice: Progress
Through Realism, 44 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 462 (1989).
87. I& at 480.
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additional limitations may have practical advantages in negotia-
tion, but may not be necessary as a permanent solution of the
issues presented.
In identifying matters for adjudication, it would be well to
heed the lessons learned from other international adjudicative
bodies. The interpretation and application of treaties, specific
texts the parties agreed to, achieves more acceptance than the
interpretation and application of more general norms of inter-
national law, especially norms of customary international law.
Equally, it is important to avoid highly political questions in the
early stages of this confidence building process.
Building upon the credibility or confidence created in this
process, states may be willing to extend the list of submitted
matters and to restrict the number of issues excluded from ju-
risdiction. The process will be long and difficult; confidence in
institutions and procedures cannot be built overnight. It will
require the cooperation of states in submitting disputes to the
International Court, under whatever jurisdictional framework
is available. Confidence cannot be built without experience,
and experience cannot be achieved without the submission of
cases. Perhaps one of the biggest flaws of the previous ap-
proach has been to save only the largest controversies for the
International Court, rather than using smaller ones to build
that confidence.
For international adjudication, this is neither the best of
times nor the worst of times. It is neither a season of Light,
nor a season of Darkness, but rather one of Twilight. Gradu-
ally building confidence in the institutions of international ad-
judication, that Twilight can become the Dawn, offering a
future in which adjudication will resolve international conflict.
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